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Abstract- Cloud internet applications have recently attracted a large number of users in the Internet. 
With the invention of these cloud internet applications, it is inefﬁcient to allocate maximum number of 
participants in real time group auction system. So an efficient approximation algorithm is proposed with 
the improved combinatorial double auction protocol. It is developed to enable different kinds of resource 
distribution among multiple users and providers. At the same time it includes more number of 
participants in an auction. Due to the NP-hardness of binary integer programming for resource 
distribution in a real time group auction system, the improved approximation algorithm is proposed to 
deal with np-hardness and to obtain the optimal solution. Participant honesty is necessary to ensure 
auction trustfulness. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing provides literally boundless 
computing power in the form of utility service to 
consumers. It enables various provisioning models 
for on-demand access to applications (Saas or 
software as a service), platforms (PaaS or platform 
as a service), and infrastructures for computing 
(IaaS). It has created a competitive market where 
consumers pay providers in order to use the 
resources. To provide the facility of trading, a 
market mechanism should be exploited to utilize 
and allocate resources within their capacities 
making sure that it does not over-provision or 
under-provision. 
Resources in cloud are geographically distributed, 
which may be heterogeneous and owned by various 
organizations with different cost and usage policies. 
A huge number of self-interested providers and 
consumers exist together. Resource allocation 
usually occurs at any time with demand and supply 
relation varying often, and resource usage cannot be 
completely anticipated. Several issues, such as 
multi-objective multi-task scheduling, automatic 
resource provisioning, and workﬂow scheduling, 
has to be solved [2], [3]. Specifically, resource 
allocation must provision the nature of 
heterogeneity, decentralization and dynamics of 
cloud. Since the allocation of resources among 
different individuals with different objectives in 
human societies is concerned with economics, many 
economic models are usually applied to resource 
allocation in cloud [4]. 
Even though there are a number of ﬁxed-price based 
approaches are used in cloud, they are inefficient 
economically [5]. Conversely, auction-based 
approaches belong to dynamic pricing and are 
economically efficient [5]. The Components of a 
cloud market can be classified buyers (consumers), 
sellers (providers), and auctioneers. Buyers are 
charged for the resources which are consumed by 
them based on their valuations, which encourages 
the competitions among buyers and also among 
sellers. Auction offers incentive not only for the 
sellers in order to provide their resources and to get 
proﬁts, but also for buyers to back off whenever it is 
necessary, regulating the demand and supply which 
arrives at market equilibrium. It can cope with the 
various and conﬂicting interests of the participants, 
match dynamic demand and supply which enables 
the participants to make decisions independently. 
Due to the above mentioned highly appealing  
advantages of the auction, there has been any 
proposals for auction based resource allocation 
approaches, and there are some cloud service 
providers who have already used auction to sell 
their resources, for example, spot instances in 
Amazon’s EC2 [6]. Since cloud computing has 
become more and more popular and since it is 
widely available, especially Inter-Cloud, distributed 
cloud, and OCX are emerging, the cloud market has 
now become really complex and increasingly 
competitive [7], [8], [9].  
In such an environment, a consumer may apply for 
various kinds of services and a provider may also 
provide various kinds of services. The services are 
provided as a combination of resources, which 
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makes the problem more difficult than focusing on a 
single resource and calling for combinatorial 
auction [10]; at the same time, appropriate resources 
may be available from a large number of providers, 
and a number of consumers may be competing for 
the same resources. Thus, the providers and 
consumers are treated symmetrically. The providers 
submit the asks and consumers submit the bids, 
calling for double auction [11]; hence, 
combinatorial double auction should be provided 
[11]. In addition, the resources demanded by a 
consumer may be offered by one provider alone, or 
by multiple providers jointly in order to, for 
example, optimize market proﬁts, balance system 
load, or partition an extra-large task among several 
providers, which cannot be accommodated by any 
single provider, especially in Inter-Cloud or 
distributed cloud. This cannot be supported by [10], 
[11] and other related solutions. Therefore, we 
improve the combinatorial double auction further to 
enable task partitioning among multiple providers. 
At the end of the auction, which provider offers the 
demanded service to which consumer based on the 
eligible transaction relationship at the same time 
whether and how a demanded service should be 
carried out by multiple providers jointly are 
decided. 
In fact, a comprehensive cloud resource allocation 
approach is really fundamental in such a 
challenging cloud market. Oriented to IaaS, we 
propose an approximation algorithm to allocate the 
following basic resources: processing, memory, 
storage, network bandwidth. In particular, we 
consider the following basic services: virtual 
machine service (VMS), computation service 
(CPS), database service (DBS), and storage service 
(STS). The major contributions of this paper are as 
follows. (1) With integration and necessary 
improvement of existing techniques, the 
approximation algorithm is proposed to 
comprehensively deal with the aforementioned 
resource allocation challenges. (2) An improved 
combinatorial double auction protocol is devised to 
enable various kinds of resources traded among 
multiple consumers and multiple providers, and at 
the same time enable task partitioning among 
multiple providers. (3) A price formation 
mechanism is devised. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A lot of auction based cloud resource allocation 
researches have been done. Several resource 
allocation strategies based on a reverse auction 
model for allocating one type of cloud resource 
from different providers are investigated. A reverse 
batch matching auction is proposed for allocating 
various kinds of cloud resources from different 
providers. In [14], a truthful online auction 
mechanism is proposed for a provider to allocate 
one type of cloud resource among consumers with 
heterogeneous demands. A continuous double 
auction mechanism is designed to enable 
consumers and providers to bid and offer one type 
of cloud resource. A knowledge based continuous 
double auction model is proposed to trade one type 
of cloud resource. A non-additive negotiation 
model is proposed with multiple objectives 
considered, by which a provider can efﬁciently 
allocate various kinds of resources to a consumer. 
In [13], cloud resource allocation is done through 
the auction of different types of VM instances, and 
a randomized combinatorial auction is proposed, 
which is computationally efﬁcient and truthful in 
expectation with guaranteed social welfare 
approximation factor. In [10], an online 
combinatorial auction framework is proposed, 
which can optimize system efﬁciency across 
temporal domain and model dynamic provisioning 
of heterogeneous VM types. In [12], a suite of 
truthful and computationally efﬁcient auction 
mechanisms for cloud resource pricing are 
proposed with the multi-unit combinatorial auction 
problem solved. In [11], a combinatorial double 
auction cloud resource allocation model is 
proposed, allowing double-sided competition and 
bidding on bundles of items.  
However, the aforementioned researches cannot 
deal with transactions of various kinds of resources 
among multiple consumers and multiple providers 
with task partitioning among multiple providers 
enabled, which is solved by our work. In addition, 
we consider VMS, CPS, DBS, and STS, which 
usually provided in IaaS cloud; in contrast, [10], 
[11], [12], [13] only consider VMS. A lot of price 
formation mechanisms have been proposed. In [5], 
[14], bidding and asking prices are given directly, 
not reﬂecting supply and demand relation. The 
asking price is determined by a dynamic pricing 
scheme based on instant supply and demand 
information. The asking price is calculated based 
on instant capacity information or historical 
win/loss ratio information. Bidding and asking 
prices are determined by a two-stage game strategy 
based on historical price information. Bidding and 
asking prices are determined by a learning 
algorithm based on historical price information. A 
genetic model based on both price and non-price 
historical information is proposed to offer suitable 
price, however, it does not adapt to rapid market 
changes.  
III. THE SYSTEM MODEL 
In the system model there are mainly two 
participants  
A. Cloud Users: 
A cloud user submits a bid defined by b(d,l,v) 
where d is a demand, and l is a demand period.  vi 
is user i’s valuation for the demand as a bidding 
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price, which indicates the maximum price that is 
acceptable for sthe user to buy the requesting 
instances. 
B. Cloud Providers: 
A cloud provider submits an offer defined by O = 
(s,w,j) s is a supply, w denotes a length of time that 
a provider is able to provide the instances between 
start time ts and end time te . Qj is provider j’s 
valuation for the supply as an offering price curve, 
which indicates the minimum of a unit price of the 
offered instances that the provider wishes to sell. 
 
Figure 1.    SYSTEM MODEL 
Figure 1 is the central controller will collect bids 
from users and offers from cloud providers. All the 
bids and offers are received by the system 
administrator. Comparing the needs of both users 
and providers the resource allocation will occur. 
All the bids after bid closing time will be rejected. 
Based on time the resources will be allocated 
between users and providers. After the auction the 
winners and losers of auction are announced. After 
that price is determined to the auction winners.  
IV. PROPOSED ALGORITHM 
Approximation algorithms are often associated 
with NP-hard problems; since it is unlikely that 
there can ever be efficient polynomial-time exact 
algorithms solving NP-hard problems, one settles 
for polynomial-time sub-optimal solutions. 
Unlike heuristics, which usually only find 
reasonably good solutions reasonably fast, one 
wants provable solution quality and provable run-
time bounds. Ideally, the approximation is optimal 
up to a small constant factor (for instance within 
5% of the optimal solution). Approximation 
algorithms are increasingly being used for 
problems where exact polynomial-time algorithms 
are known but are too expensive due to the input 
size. A typical example for an approximation 
algorithm is the one for vertex cover in graphs: find 
an uncovered edge and add both endpoints to the 
vertex cover, until none remain. It is clear that the 
resulting cover is at most twice as large as the 
optimal one. This is a constant factor 
approximation algorithm with a factor of 2. 
NP-hard problems vary greatly in their 
approximability; some, such as the bin packing 
problem, can be approximated within any factor 
greater than 1 (such a family of approximation 
algorithms is often called a polynomial time 
approximation scheme or PTAS). Others are 
impossible to approximate within any constant, or 
even polynomial factor unless P = NP, such as 
the maximum clique problem. 
NP-hard problems can often be expressed 
as integer programs (IP) and solved exactly 
in exponential time. Many approximation 
algorithms emerge from the linear programming 
relaxation of the integer program. 
For some approximation algorithms it is possible to 
prove certain properties about the approximation of 
the optimum result. For example, a ρ-
approximation algorithm A is defined to be an 
algorithm for which it has been proven that the 
value/cost, f(x), of the approximate solution A(x) to 
an instance x will not be more (or less, depending 
on the situation) than a factor ρ times the value, 
OPT, of an optimum solution. 
 
           ρ          ρ   
ρ                        ρ   
  
The factor ρ is called the relative performance 
guarantee. An approximation algorithm has an 
absolute performance guarantee or bounded error c, 
if it has been proven for every instance x that 
                     
Similarly, the performance guarantee, R(x,y), of a 
solution y to an instance x is defined as 
           
   
    
 
    
   
  
where f(y) is the value/cost of the solution y for the 
instance x. Clearly, the performance guarantee is 
greater than or equal to 1 and equal to 1 if and only 
if y is an optimal solution. If an algorithm A 
guarantees to return solutions with a performance 
guarantee of at most r(n), then A is said to be an 
r(n)-approximation algorithm and has an 
approximation ratio of r(n). Likewise, a problem 
with an r(n)-approximation algorithm is said to be 
r(n)-approximable or have an approximation ratio 
of r(n). 
V. SIMULATION AND PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION 
The Group auction system with approximation 
algorithm for resource allocation is simulated in 
“cloudsim”. The market scale is classiﬁed into six 
categories according to the number of users and 
providers in cloud market, as shown in Table 1.  
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Table1: 
1 Tiny 
2 Small 
3 Medium 
4 Large 
5 Huge 
6 Oversized 
In order to evaluate economic efﬁciency and 
trustfulness of Group Auction System, we use 
simulation to verify its effectiveness and compare 
its performance with its counterpart SCDA [16] in 
resource allocation. In SCDA, a compulsory 
bidding is added to Continuous Double Auction to 
promote continuous matching and immediate 
allocation with low runtime overhead. In particular, 
it deals with resource allocation among self-
interested participants in a dynamic and distributed 
market. Due to the treatment situation similarity 
and the auction nature, we choose the counterpart 
which applies SCDA as the comparison benchmark 
to Group Auction System. 
 
Figure 2 RESULTS COMPARISION 
Figure 2 shows the comparison graph of resource 
allocation for cloud internet applications in SCDA 
and GAS. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we have proposed an approximation 
algorithm for efficient allocation of cloud internet 
applications and to accommodate more number of 
participants in the real time group auction system. 
In the current system, formulated binary integer 
programming is known to be NP-hard that the 
number of different allocations to be evaluated 
exponentially increases as the numbers of users and 
providers increases. So, binary integer 
programming is not efficient when there is more 
number of participants. To overcome this problem 
approximation algorithm is proposed which solves 
np-hard problems. As our future work, we have two 
areas to improve.  First, finding the best bid closing 
time. Second, we can include many bidding 
strategies in auction. 
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